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Inform: An Application to Fair Trade
Certification
Matthew C. Rousu and Jay R. Corrigan
Abstract
Government officials and other policymakers often face difficult decisions determining what
information must be provided to consumers in the limited space available on food labels. An ideal
label will cause consumers to make the same purchase that they would make if they had all
relevant information, while an inferior label will induce a consumer to purchase a product he
would not purchase if more information were available or to forgo purchasing a product that
would have yielded positive consumer surplus. We present the design and results of an
experimental auction that allows researchers to compare several alternative labels in order to
determine the welfare loss from labels that do not adequately inform consumers. Further, we
compare a set of candidate labels to assess whether one of the labels is better or worse at
informing consumers.




Firms spend billions of dollars annually on new product and label designs in order 
to attract and retain customers.  The issue of labeling is also important to 
government agencies and nonprofit labeling organizations.  For example, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration has an organizational body in its Office of 
Nutritional Products that deals with issues of food and dietary supplement 
labeling.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service also deals with labeling through its Labeling and Consumer Protection 
Staff.  These government agencies spend millions of dollars trying to ensure that 
food labels adequately inform consumers.  One issue that has not been examined 
is the welfare difference to consumers from alternative labeling 
schemes/regulations.  It seems likely that different labels would differ in 
effectiveness at informing consumers.   
Ideally, a government body would like consumers to know all relevant 
information about a food product before they make a purchase.  However, this is 
usually impossible, so there would be a welfare loss for consumers who are not 
well informed because some would purchase products they would not otherwise 
purchase.  This indicates that a welfare loss to consumers results from the 
existence of inadequate labels.
1  A first reaction of many would be that simply 
placing additional (accurate) information on a label would certainly lead to better 
consumer choices.  However, there is evidence that simply placing information on 
a label may not be enough to adequately inform consumers.  Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux (2002) find that a label on the back of a product indicating that an 
ingredient is genetically engineered does not influence consumer behavior; 
however, when the attribute is specifically shown to consumers, their demand for 
the product drops.  Beyond how and where to place information, however, is the 
question of what is the “right” information to place on a label.   
It is not safe to assume that more information on a label will automatically 
provide better information to consumers.  Research has shown that labels 
containing too much information can adversely impact consumer decision making 
(Feick et al., 1986; Heroux, Laroache, and McGown, 1988).  One recent study by 
Wansick, Sonka, and Hasler (2004) examines how well consumers can recall 
product traits based on alternative nutrition labels.  They find that short nutrition 
                                                 
1 There is another potential interpretation of labels: that they serve more as a signal of quality than 
as a source of information.  Caswell and Padberg (1992) discuss how labels can help provide 
better signals to consumers about quality, especially when dealing with experience or credence 
goods.  More recently, Marette et al. (2007) discuss how geographical indications on labels can 
serve as a signal of quality based on geographic origin.  If one perceived labels as providing a 
signal instead of trying to inform, one would be assessing the welfare loss when a label sends an 
inadequate signal to consumers. 
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claims on the front of packages do a better job of informing consumers about 
specific product attributes than longer labels.   
More recently, researchers have begun to estimate the value of labels.   
Equivalently, these studies that place value on labels are simultaneously (and 
implicitly) measuring the welfare loss from labels that do not adequately inform 
consumers.  Teisl, Bocksteal, and Levy (2001) estimated the value of nutrition 
labels and found that households placed a value on the nutritional information, on 
average, of between $0.096 and $0.542 per product each month.  Dhar and Foltz 
(2005) estimate the value of labels on milk products indicating the products are 
rBST-free or organic vs. regularly labeled milk.  They estimate a benefit to U.S. 
consumers of regularly labeled milk (which they call “unlabeled”) of 
approximately $130 million annually, and a benefit of $2.5 billion per year of 
having rBST-free and organic milk available in the market.  Kiesel and Villa-
Boas (2007) estimate the value of USDA organic seals on milk at $2.1 billion 
annually to U.S. consumers.  
While these studies implicitly estimate the welfare loss incurred by 
consumers from labels that do not adequately inform, they assume the label with 
more information is, by definition, the superior label.  By doing this, these studies 
make an ex ante assumption on the superiority of a given label.  Thus, according 
to these studies, any change in behavior must mean the consumer is gaining value 
from that label.  This is a key limitation, as government agencies that make 
labeling laws may wish to examine alternative labels without ex ante knowledge 
of which label would best inform consumers. 
This paper’s contribution is to present the design and implementation of 
an experimental auction that allows estimation of the welfare loss from labels 
relative to a state in which consumers have been provided with detailed, objective, 
verifiable information about a product.  The experimental design tests multiple 
labels, but makes no ex ante assumption about which label will best inform 
consumers.  This experimental design also allows for estimation of the welfare 
losses across labels, which could be a valuable tool for policymakers who are 
designing labeling regulations.   
 
2. Experimental design 
 
We designed and conducted an experimental auction to examine the effects of 
alternative labels on consumer demand.  Our goal was to determine the welfare 
loss from labels and also examine which label would best/worst inform 
consumers.  We chose fair trade food products for this purpose.  Fair trade food 
products, which are typically produced in developing countries for export, differ 
from conventional food products in that farmers are guaranteed above-market 
prices in exchange for abiding by labor and environmental practices laid out by 
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the labeling organization.  For example, in December 2005 cocoa producers were 
guaranteed a price of either $1,750 per metric ton if the world price for similarly 
graded cocoa was at or below $1,600, or the world price plus $150 per metric ton 
if the world price exceeded $1,600.  Using fair trade products is ideal for a study 
on labeling, as many consumers may be unfamiliar with what is meant by “fair 
trade.”  Because of this, it is unclear what type of label would best inform 
consumers. 
We conducted our auction “in the field,” at a grocery store.  Field 
experiments are gaining much more prominence in applied economic work, as 
they provide many of the benefits of laboratory experiments, but are conducted in 
settings that are more familiar to participants (Harrison and List, 2004).  Several 
recent experimental auctions have been conducted in a field setting (e.g., see 
Rousu et al. 2005, Lusk et al. 2001b) because of the associated benefits. Chief 
among these is that the field environment (often a grocery store) is more familiar 
to participants, and the opportunity cost for participants is lower, allowing for 
lower participation fees.  These field auctions can best be thought of as “framed 
field experiments” because they make use of laboratory valuation techniques but 
using a nonstandard pool of participants and a good widely available in the field 
(Harrison and List, 2004). 
We conducted our field experiments at two Weis Markets grocery stores 
in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in October 2005.  A 2005 study conducted by the 
market research firm Acxiom found that Harrisburg was one of the twenty most 
demographically representative metro areas in the United States (Bremner, 2005).  
One hundred twenty-two participants took part in the study, either one at a time or 
in groups of seven or fewer, depending on how many other people were interested 
in participating at the same time.  Table 1 presents demographic characteristics of 
auction participants. 
 
2.1 Stages in the experimental auction 
 
The experimental auction had six stages: 
Stage one.  As shoppers entered the store, they were invited to take part in 
a “consumer research project” that would take about 15 minutes, and for which 
they would be paid $10.   
Stage two.  The monitor provided participants with both written and oral 
instructions on the workings of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (1964) auction 
mechanism to be used.
2  In particular, the monitor explained that the participant(s) 
                                                 
2 We chose the demand-revealing BDM auction mechanism over other demand-revealing auction 
mechanisms (e.g., Vickrey auction, random nth-price auction) because we knew the number of 
participants would vary.  The BDM auction is appropriate for either one participant or multiple 
participants, while the other common auction mechanisms will not work with only one participant.   
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would place separate bids on a number of different goods, but that only one of 
these goods would actually be sold and that this would be determined at random.  
The monitor went on to explain that the binding price for that good would be 
determined at random by drawing a number from a jar containing sixty tickets 
marked with prices ranging from $0.10 to $6.00 in 10¢ increments.
3  Participants 
who submitted a bid greater than or equal to the binding price would purchase the 
good at the binding price; participants who submitted a bid lower than the binding 
price would purchase nothing.  Participants were explicitly informed that it was in 
their best interest to bid truthfully.  Participants were given a chance to ask 
questions, and they then took part in a practice auction.   
Stage three.  The monitor revealed the products for sale: a 2-pound bunch 
of bananas, a 2-pound bunch of fair trade bananas, a 3.5-ounce chocolate bar, and 
a 3.5–ounce fair trade chocolate bar.   
Stage four.  The monitor explained that participants would place separate 
bids on several food products, that only one of these bidding opportunities would 
be binding, and that the binding bid would be determined at random after all bids 
were submitted.  Participants submitted their first set of four bids, and then were 
                                                 
3 One inescapable drawback of the BDM auction mechanism is that the range from which the 
binding price is drawn may have an anchoring effect on participants’ bids (i.e., participants may 
believe that the top or bottom end of the range conveys some meaningful information about a 
good’s value.)  While it is impossible to determine whether our data are effected by this kind of 
anchoring, because the price range was the same across participants and across products, any 
anchoring effect would be present for all bids.  Later in the paper we use relative consumer surplus 
comparisons to determine whether participants would choose to purchase the conventional or fair 
trade version of a product.  An anchoring effect that influenced bids for both products by the same 
absolute amount or by the same proportion would have no impact which product is chosen in this 
analysis. 
Table 1: Characteristics of the auction participants (N=122) 
Variable Definition  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Gender  1 if female  0.62   
Age Participant’s  age  46.5  16.0 
Education  Years of schooling  13.7  2.2 
Income  Household income (in thousands)  29.8  24.2 
White  1 if participant is white  0.60   
Black  1 if participant is black  0.34   
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provided with objective information about fair trade certification before 
submitting another set of four bids.
4, 5 
Stage five.  The monitor randomly determined which of the eight bidding 
opportunities was binding, then randomly determined the selling price.   
Stage six.  Participants completed a survey about whether they had 
intended to purchase bananas or chocolate when they arrived at the store that day, 
the price they would expect to pay for those products outside of the experimental 
auction, and other demographic and background information.  Participants were 
then dismissed one by one, at which point they were paid and any individual with 
a winning bid purchased the product.  The auction instructions can be found in 
Appendix A.   
 
2.2 Verifiable information 
 
Following Rousu et al. (2007) and Huffman et al. (2007), we provided 
participants with verifiable information about fair trade.  With products that are 
new (or products produced in a new way), it is often difficult for consumers to 
receive accurate and unbiased information.  Verifiable information provides an 
objective assessment of the benefits and costs, which should allow for more 
informed choices from consumers.  The information that we presented to 
participants was approved as accurate by several parties with no financial ties to 
fair trade foods.  The information used can be found in Appendix B. 
 
2.3 Food products and labels 
 
Participants bid on two different food products in this experiment: bananas and 
chocolate.  These were chosen because of the availability of fair trade versions of 
these products and because they are commonly consumed by Americans.  To help 
ensure bids were not driven by perceived quality differences in the products, the 
                                                 
4 To test for the existence of a “Hawthorne effect” where participants bid differently in the second 
round not because of the information provided but because they believe the researcher expects 
them to, participants in a small pretest (N = 28) were given no information between rounds.  Bids 
did not vary significantly across rounds for any of the four products for sale.  
5 While participants placed two bids per product (one before and one after receiving information), 
we did not post the winning price between rounds.  Proponents of posted prices argue that the 
practice provides market-like feedback that helps enforce rationality among participants who 
might place bids that are not consistent with their preferences (e.g., see Lusk et al. 2001a; Cherry 
et al. 2004).  Posted prices may also help participants formulate a value for an unfamiliar product.  
For example, List and Shogren (1999) find that while posted prices influence median bids for 
unfamiliar products, they do not influence median bids for familiar products or when are provided 
with additional non-price information.  However, given that the winning price is determined at 
random in the BDM auction, the benefits from posted prices are likely to be small and may be 
outweighed by anchoring (Corrigan and Rousu 2006b).   
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fair trade and conventional bananas were carefully chosen to look similar and to 
weigh approximately the same amount (2 pounds).  Both types of chocolate bars 
also weighed the same amount (3.5 ounces) and appeared similar.  Labels for the 
conventional products were made as plain as possible to avoid any 
labeling/branding effects.  Three different fair trade labels were used in this 
experiment, and the label an individual participant saw varied depending on the 
treatment.  We randomly assigned treatments to the participants based on their 
arrival time at the grocery store, so the estimation of the treatment effect is the 
difference in means across treatments (Wooldridge, 2002).   
In the “simple label” treatment, fair trade product labels indicated that 
those products were “fair trade certified” with no additional explanation.   
In the “short descriptive” label treatment, fair trade products displayed a 
“fair trade certified” graphic provided by TransFair USA, a California-based non-
governmental organization that certified both the bananas and the chocolate used 
in this study, along with the following short descriptive statement: “Buy fair trade 
and make a difference in your global community.”  At the time the experiment 
was conducted, a specialty grocery chain was using this language to promote its 
fair trade offerings.   
In the “long descriptive” label treatment, fair trade products displayed the 
same TransFair USA graphic along with the following longer descriptive 
statement recommended by TransFair USA: “By choosing this Fair Trade product 
you are directly supporting a better life for farming families through fair prices, 
direct trade, community development, and environmental stewardship.”  At the 
time the experiment was conducted, TransFair USA suggested using this language 
on product labels.  Figure 1 presents all four chocolate bar labels.
6    
For each product, participants placed a bid for both a fair trade version and 
a non-fair trade (conventional) version of the product.  Depending on the 
treatment, participants bid on either (1) conventional products and fair trade 
products with the simple label, (2) conventional products and fair trade products 
with the short descriptive label, or (3) conventional products and fair trade 
products with the long descriptive label.  
 
3. Model to determine the welfare loss from alternative labels 
 
We now discuss the methodology used to determine the welfare loss from labels 
that inadequately inform consumers.  We compared bids before and after a 
                                                 
6 An interesting extension of this research would be to test whether other alternative labels would 
be more or less appealing to consumers.  For example, some consumers may worry that the 
additional income farmers receive from selling fair trade commodities does not justify the markup 
retailers charge for fair trade products.  Labels that provide explicit information about the 
premium farmers receive may best address this concern. 





Figure 1.  Chocolate bar labels 
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consumer read verifiable information to examine how well the label informed 
consumers.  A participant that is more informed after reading verifiable 
information should be able to provide bids that more accurately represent her 
preferences.  If a participant’s bid for a product before she received verifiable 
information is the same as (or very similar to) her bid for a product after she 
received verifiable information, this provides evidence that the label did an 
effective job describing the attributes of a fair trade product.  However, if a 
participant’s bid for a product in the absence of the verifiable information is quite 
different from her bid after being informed by the government information, this 
provides evidence that the label was ineffective at describing the attributes of the 
product.  This model allows us to determine the effectiveness of labels on fair 
trade food products.    
Following Rousu et al. (2007) and Rousu and Shogren (2006), we first 
consider the consumer surplus a participant would receive from buying either the 
fair trade product or the conventional product.   
 
K K j, K j, P_FT Bid_FT _ − = CS FT  (1) 
 
K K j, K j, P_CONV Bid_CONV _ − = CS CONV  (2) 
Equation (1) shows that the consumer surplus participant j receives from buying 
the fair trade version of product K is simply the difference in the participant’s bid 
(her demand) and the price the participant would pay for the product in the 
market.  Similarly, equation (2) shows the consumer surplus consumer j receives 
from buying the conventional version of product K.
7        
  For modeling purposes, we assume each participant purchases one and 
only one version of each product.  A participant would then purchase the product 
that gives her the higher amount of consumer surplus.
8  So prior to receiving 
verifiable information, participant j would buy the fair trade version of product K 
                                                 
7 We estimate the market prices for both bananas and chocolate using market prices at the time of 
the experiment.  For bananas, the fair trade bananas were $1.98 for a 2-pound bunch while the 
conventional bananas were $1.38 for a 2-pound bunch.  The fair trade chocolate was $2.50 for a 
3.5-ounce bar while the conventional chocolate sold for $2.07.   
8 Several studies (e.g., Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström 2004) find that experimental auction bids 
may be censored at or near a good’s field price (i.e., its price outside of the experiment).  Since 
conventional bananas and chocolate are readily available in the field, we would expect field price 
censoring to affect bids and consumer surplus estimates for the conventional products.  Following 
Lancaster (1971), we assume that participants’ WTP for a product is determined by their WTP for 
that product’s various traits.  More specifically, we assume that WTP for the fair trade version of a 
product is simply equal to (censored) WTP for the conventional product plus WTP for the fair 
trade designation as applied to that product.  Under this assumption, field price censoring affects 
bids and consumer surplus estimates for both products equally even though the fair trade products 
were not available in Harrisburg, PA when we conducted this study.  Therefore, we can 
meaningfully infer whether a participant would choose to buy the conventional or fair trade 
version of a product by comparing consumer surplus estimates for both versions. 
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when the consumer surplus from purchasing the fair trade version exceeds the 
consumer surplus from buying the conventional version, as shown in equation (3): 
 
K j, K j, ,
info - pre _ _   if   1 _ CS CONV CS FT FT BUY
K j ≥ = . (3) 
Similarly, participants would purchase the conventional version of product K 
when: 
 
K j, K j, ,
info - pre _ _   if   0 _ CS CONV CS FT FT BUY
K j < = . (4) 
After receiving verifiable information, participant j would purchase the fair trade 
version of product K when: 
 
K j, K j, ,
info - post _ _   if   1 _ CS CONV CS FT FT BUY
K j ≥ = . (5) 
Participant j would purchase the conventional version of product K when: 
 
K j, K j, ,
info - post _ _   if   0 _ CS CONV CS FT FT BUY
K j < = . (6) 
We assume the verifiable information given to participants is accurate, and ideally 
the government would like all consumers to know this information when making 
food purchasing decisions.  We will call a participant “informed” after she 
receives verifiable information.  Our analysis will classify a label as causing a 
“mispurchase” when the participant would purchase a fair trade product when less 
informed but a conventional product when informed, or vice versa.  This is shown 
in equation (7): 
 
label K j label K j




info - post , , _ _   if   1 _ ≠ = . (7) 
If participant j purchases the same version of product K both before and after 
becoming informed, then that label would be adequate for that participant.   
However, if a participant purchases a different version after becoming informed 
(e.g., purchases the fair trade version when she would have purchased the 
conventional version), then the label is inadequate for informing that participant 
and has caused a mispurchase.  In our experiment there were three labeling 
treatments, so our experimental design and model will allow us to determine the 
relative effectiveness of these three labels.   
While we now know how to examine whether a participant would make a 
mispurchase, we want to determine the welfare loss participants would incur by 
making a mispurchase.  To do this, we examine the consumer surplus a 
participant would forgo because she was purchasing a different product from what 
she would purchase when informed.  We examine the relative consumer surplus a 
participant receives by purchasing one product instead of the other.  When 
informed, each participant would purchase the product that gives her the higher 
consumer surplus, so the consumer surplus premium the participant receives is: 
 
K j, K j, , _ _   _ CS CONV CS FT PREM CS
K j − = . (8) 
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All participants gain a nonnegative premium by being able to purchase the 
product that gives them higher consumer surplus.  This premium can be used to 
determine the welfare loss from an inadequate label.   
If a participant makes a mispurchase, she is not obtaining the premium as 
shown in equation (8).  Thus, this premium represents the welfare loss to a 
participant who would make a mispurchase prior to receiving verifiable 
information.   In other words, the label alone was not adequate in giving the 
participant the necessary information for her to make an informed choice.  The 
premium represents the welfare loss from a sub-optimal label when a participant 
makes a mispurchase.   
We will measure two different welfare losses from inappropriate labels.  
The first is the average welfare loss to the participants who are being adversely 
affected and would switch to purchase the alternative product (i.e., making a 
mispurchase because they are inadequately informed); the second is the average 

















rson WelLoss_pe . (10) 
Through our model, we can measure the welfare losses from alternative labels.  
We also examine whether any of the three labels are inferior or superior to the 
others.  Finally, our experimental design and implementation allow us to conduct 
conditional tests examining what factors cause a consumer to lose welfare 




Mean and median bid prices are provided in Table 2.  Overall, participants place a 
premium on the fair trade version of the products between $0.10 and $0.24 per 
product, and this effect is statistically significant.
9 
  Table 3 shows the percentage of participants who switch both to and from 
the fair trade version of each product under each labeling scheme.  Three facts 
emerge.  First, for each label, there are some participants who would make 
mispurchases.  Some would initially buy the fair trade product but would buy the 
conventional product after receiving verifiable information;  others would initially 
                                                 
9 A study that extended this work by examining the costs to firms of selling fair trade foods could 
be useful as it would provide an indication whether firms would increase profits by selling fair 
trade food products.   
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buy the conventional product but would buy the fair trade product after receiving 
verifiable information.  Across treatments, between 11.1% and 15.4% of 
participants would switch to or from the fair trade bananas, while between 13.9% 
and 17.9% of participants would switch to or from the fair trade chocolate bar.  
Because we provide verifiable information – and because the fair trade 
designation may mean different things to different people
10 – it seems reasonable 
that some participants place a greater value on fair trade foods after reading the 
information, while others placed a lower value on fair trade foods after reading it.   
Second, the long descriptive label may outperform the simple label in that 
the long descriptive label leads to a smaller percentage of mispurchases for both 
bananas and chocolate.  However, this difference is not statistically significant.  
One potential reason for the statistically insignificant results is the small number 
of switchers.  While our overall sample size of 122 is larger than that of many 
other experimental auctions (e.g. Lusk et al., 2001a; Fox et al., 2002; Corrigan 
and Rousu, 2006a), only 14 participants made a mispurchase for bananas and only 
                                                 
10 For example, political commentator Lou Dobbs (2004) refers to “calls by members of Congress 
for this country to conduct fair trade and balanced trade,” referring to the rights of domestic 
manufacturing workers, not foreign farm workers.   
Table 2: Mean and median bid prices (N=122)  
 
 Pre-information  Post-information 








































* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
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Table 3: Number and percentage of consumers that mispurchase  
 







































































































* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
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22 for chocolate.  Researchers using this methodology in future studies may wish 
to consider a larger sample.
11  
Third, objective information about fair trade leads to a significant number 
of switches for both goods and for all three label treatments.  As a service to 
customers, retailers may wish to provide this kind of information to consumers.  
However, because our results indicate objective information causes the same 
number of participants to switch from fair trade products as it causes to switch to 
fair trade products, we do not find evidence that a large-scale consumer education 
campaign would increase sales of fair trade foods. 
While Table 3 examines the percentage of participants who switch, 
examining what factors cause a consumer to initially make a mispurchase and 
switch after receiving information is also worth exploring.  Table 4 presents the 
results of a random-effects logit analysis controlling for the label treatment, 
demographic characteristics, and the bid submitted in round one.
12  We find no 
evidence that there is a difference across labels, since the coefficients for the 
dummy variables on the labeling types are not statistically significant.  We do 
find, however, that participants age 40 years or older were less likely to make a 
mispurchase, indicating that older participants were more likely to correctly 
interpret the label and make the correct purchase based on their tastes.  We also 
find that participants who initially bid higher on the products are less likely to 
switch to either the fair trade product or away from the fair trade product.  This 
provides evidence that those who initially indicated a higher value for bananas or 
chocolate were less likely to be influenced by information.   
Table 5 presents the welfare loss from inadequate labels.  The average 
welfare loss from banana labels ranges from $0.037 to $0.077 per bunch.   
Similarly, the average welfare loss from a chocolate labels ranges from $0.101 to 
$0.134 per bar.  These differences are statistically significant at the 10% level 
using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
13  For both products, the smallest welfare loss 
appears for the short-descriptive label, but statistical tests do not indicate any 
statistically significant differences across labels. 
 
                                                 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
12 An anonymous reviewer mentioned how it would have been useful to ask how much 
information participants knew/understood about fair trade labels prior to the experiment, as prior 
knowledge has been shown to influence food purchasing decisions (e.g. see Huffman et al. 2007).  
Unfortunately, given time constraints of a field experiment our questionnaire was quite limited 
and this question was not asked.  Future experimental research looking into preferences for fair 
trade foods may wish to assess the effects of prior knowledge.   
13 T-tests yield similar results, which are available from the authors upon request. 
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Governments and nonprofit agencies spend millions of dollars annually in an 
attempt to adequately label food products.  This is complicated because while 
food labels would ideally allow consumers to behave as if they were fully 
informed, space constraints on labels and time constraints on consumers mean 
that labels cannot in reality convey all relevant information.  However, little work 
has been done to develop methods that can determine the welfare loss when an 


































Initial bid for conventional product  -0.86*** 
(-4.34) 
---- 
Initial bid for fair trade product  ----  -0.78*** 
(-4.43) 





a Dependant variable equals 1 if a participant initially made a mispurchase but 
switched after receiving verifiable information. 
b t-statistic in parentheses 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a 2-sided t-test. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level using a 2-sided t-test.  
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Table 5: Welfare loss from Alternative labels  
 
































































































a Number who mispurchase in brackets. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level in a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level in a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level in a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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inferior label is implemented, and there has also been minimal research showing a 
method to compare several alternative labels for effectiveness.   
  We fill this gap in the literature by creating an experimental design and 
applied model that allows for the estimation of the welfare loss from alternative 
labels, and allows researchers to determine which label from a candidate set best 
informs consumers.  This type of research is important, as several government and 
nonprofit agencies are beginning to use experimental auctions to attempt to 
answer these types of questions.   
Using three candidate labels to indicate that a food product is fair trade 
certified, we estimate the number of people who make a mispurchase and the 
welfare loss from each of the three labels. We find that between 11.1% and 17.9% 
of participants would make a mispurchase, depending on the product and label, 
but find no evidence that one label performs significantly better than others 
among our candidate set of labels.  The welfare loss to consumers from being 
inadequately informed ranged from $0.037 to $0.134 per product. 
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
 
 
Welcome and thank you for agreeing to participate in this research on decision 
making.   
 
Because we are interested in the value that you personally place on various 
products, we ask that you please refrain from communicating with other 
participants during this research. 
 
Please be assured that all information collected here will only be used for group 
comparisons.  No personal information will be divulged for any reason, and we 
will never be able to attach your name to any of your responses. 
 
 
How this Auction Works 
 
Today we are going to hold a limit price auction.  In this auction you’ll be asked 
to write down your bids on a sheet of paper.  All bids will be kept private.   
 
The auction has five steps: 
 
Step 1:  You examine all the products potentially for sale. 
 
Step  2:  You write down separate bids for each product (for example, four 
products means four separate bids). 
 
Step  3:  The monitor draws a number at random to determine the binding 
product.  Only the binding product will actually be sold.  This is done 
to make sure that no one ends up buying more than one product. 
 
Step 4:  The monitor randomly selects a limit price between $0.10 and $6.00 
(in 10-cent increments). 
 
Step 5:  We compare your bid for the binding product with the limit price to 
determine whether you purchase the product. 
 
•  If your bid is equal to or higher than the limit price, you buy the 
product and pay the limit price.   
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Please note that in this auction it is always in your best interest to bid your true 
value for a product.  This is because if you win the auction you do not pay what 
you bid, you pay the randomly chosen limit
 price.  If you bid less than your true 
value, you might end up missing out on a profitable opportunity.  If you bid more 
than your true value, you might end up paying more than you wanted to for the 
product.  Also, keep in mind that you are not bidding against anyone else in this 
auction—whether you purchase the product depends only on your bid and the 





As a warm-up exercise you will place separate bids on two products: an box of 
pencils and a box of pens.   
 
This auction is only for practice.  It is simply intended to familiarize you with the 
steps we will be using in the real auction that follows. 
 
 
Step 1:  You examine the two products. 
 
Step 2:  You write down separate bids for each product. 
 
Step  3:  The monitor draws a number at random to determine the binding 
product. 
 
Step 4:  The monitor randomly selects a limit price between $0.10 and $6.00. 
 
Step 5:  We compare your bid for the binding product with the limit price to 




Again, in this type of auction it is always in your best interest to bid your true 
value for each product. 





In this auction you will place separate bids on several food products.   
 




Step 1:  You examine the food products. 
 
Step 2:  You write down separate bids for each product. 
 
Step  3:  The monitor draws a number at random to determine the binding 
product. 
 
Step 4:  The monitor randomly selects a limit price between $0.10 and $6.00. 
 
Step 5:  We compare your bid for the binding product with the limit price to 
determine whether you purchase the product. 
 
 
Again, in this type of auction it is always in your best interest to bid your true 
value for each product. 
 
 
Thanks again for participating in this research project.  At this point the monitor 
will determine the binding product and any transactions agreed to will be carried 
out. 
 
Before leaving, we also ask that you complete a short survey.  Your responses 
will only be used for group comparisons, and we will never be able to connect 
your name to any of your responses. 
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Please answer the following questions by checking the appropriate box or by filling in the appropriate line.  Remember 
that we will never be able to connect your name to any of your responses. 
 
1)  How often do you or your family members eat bananas? 
  Every day 
  More than once a week 
  About once a week 
  About once a month 
  Almost never 
 
2)  How many pounds of bananas do you currently have at 
home? 
  None 
  1 pound (2 or 3 bananas) 
  2 pounds (5 or 6 bananas) 
  3-4 pounds 
  5-7 pounds 
  8 or more pounds 
 
3)  How many pounds of bananas do you normally have at 
home? 
  None 
  1 pound (2 or 3 bananas) 
  2 pounds (5 or 6 bananas) 
  3-4 pounds 
  5-7 pounds 
  8 or more pounds 
 
4)  Were you planning to buy bananas today?  
  Yes 
  No 
5)  How often do you or your family members eat chocolate? 
  Every day 
  More than once a week 
  About once a week 
  About once a month 
  Almost never 
 
6)  How many chocolate bars do you currently have at home? 
  None 
  1 
  2 
  3-4 
  5-7 
  8 or more 
 
 
7)  How many chocolate bars do you normally have at home? 
  None 
  1 
  2 
  3-4 
  5-7 
  8 or more 
 
 
8)  Were you planning to buy chocolate today?  
  Yes 
  No 
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9)  How much do you think a bunch of bananas similar to the 




10)  How much do you think a candy bar similar to the ones you 




11)  How often do you buy organic or fair trade products? 
  Whenever possible 
  Sometimes 
  Almost never 
 
12)  Are you a member of an environmental organization? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
13)  Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 10 if a 1 
means saving jobs at all costs, and a 10 means saving the 
environment at all costs? (CIRCLE JUST ONE) 
 
  1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9       10 
 
14)  Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 10 if a 1 
means that you only care about you and your family’s 
wellbeing, and a 10 means that you only care about the 
wellbeing of future generations and people living in other 
countries? (CIRCLE JUST ONE) 
 
  1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9       10 
 
15)  What is your gender? 
  Male 
  Female 
 
16)  What is your age?  _____________ 
 
17)  What is your race? 
  White, non-Hispanic 
  Black 
  Hispanic 
  Other 
 
18)  What is your highest level of education? 
  Some high school 
  High school diploma 
  Some college 
  4-year college degree 
  Some graduate school 
  Graduate degree 
 
19)  Are you currently attending college? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
20)  What is your approximate annual household income (before 
taxes)? 
 Less than $14,999   $50,000-$74,999 
 $15,000-$24,999   $75,000-$99,999 
 $25,000-$34,999   $100,000-$149,999 
 $35,000-$49,999   $150,000 or more. 
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Appendix B: Information on Fair Trade Given to Participants 
 
The following statement on fair trade has been approved by a group of academic, 
religious, and community leaders who have no financial stake in fair trade foods: 
 
The fair trade movement promotes international labor, environmental, and social 
standards.  The movement focuses on exports from poorer countries such as 
Ecuador and Ghana to richer countries such as the United States.  Standards may 
be voluntarily adhered to by importing firms, or enforced by governments.   
Proposed and practiced fair trade policies vary widely, but most often take the 
form of minimum price support schemes for products such as bananas, cocoa, and 
coffee.  Non-government organizations also play a role in promoting fair trade 
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